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Recently, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has decided that certain
cuts on wages for civil servants in the Land Baden-Württemberg are unconstitutional
because they violate the principle of equitable and equal alimentation according
to Art. 33(5) of the German Basic Law. The judgment reveals interesting parallels
to the jurisprudence of the Portuguese Constitutional Court (PCC) regarding pay
cuts for public employees in the context of austerity measures during the Eurozone
crisis. Both courts rely on the principle of equality and require the legislator to
provide a reasoned justification during the legislative procedure as well as the
explicit consideration of alternative measures. While this form of proceduralization
of judicial review significantly interferes with the political margin of appreciation
of the legislator, it also sets clear limits to austerity measures. It establishes a
constitutional answer to the so-called “there is no alternative” (TINA) rhetoric that
has largely dominated the political discourse on budgetary consolidation in the past.
From this perspective, this line of jurisprudence allows for opening up a political and
constitutional discourse that has become somewhat colonized by purely economic
and financial considerations.
Civil servants cannot be subjected to greater
burdens than others
The German FCC had to decide on the constitutionality of a provision of the
Remuneration Act of the Land Baden-Württemberg according to which the basic
remuneration and any additional allowances paid inter alia to judges during the first
three years of service have been cut by eight percent. Shortly before this measure,
a four-percent cut had already been put in place. This case exclusively concerned
a particular group of public servants, whereas Portuguese pay cuts over the last
years concerned all public employees (extended English summaries available for
the rulings delivered in 2012, 2013, and 2014a and 2014b). Therefore, the FCC
had to decide on the issue of equal treatment amongst public servants (principle of
equal alimentation), while its Portuguese counterpart had to decide about the equal
treatments of employees in the public and in the private sector (equality before public
burdens).
However, in an obiter dictum the FCC nonetheless stated that while pay cuts for civil
servants based on purely financial considerations are only possible in exceptional
fiscal situations, civil servants are in general not expected to shoulder more financial
burdens than other groups. The FCC decided that pay cuts for civil servants always
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interfere with the principle of equitable alimentation, which requires remuneration
based on the actual tasks and responsibilities of the respective office. Therefore,
the object of fiscal consolidation alone does not justify additional sacrifices of civil
servants. Instead, in assessing the constitutionality of pay cuts for civil servants, the
cumulative effects of various measures and cuts have to be taken into consideration.
Also, the legislator has to make sure that civil servants entrusted with the same tasks
are treated equally even when it comes to additional financial burdens. In the case at
hand, these requirements were not fulfilled as the additional cut only applied to R1-
judges who have just entered public service whereas R1-judges that have already
been in service were not affected.
The reasoning of the FCC is fully in line with the reasoning applied by the PCC
in its austerity jurisprudence between 2011 and 2014. While the PCC accepted
a first round of pay cuts in the light of the severe and exceptional financial crisis,
it later applied a stricter standard. The PCC based its reasoning on a peculiar
interpretation of the principle of proportional equality that requires public pay cuts to
be proportionate both to the pursued goal but also when compared with the financial
burden shouldered by other societal groups. Hence, while public employees can be
expected to shoulder significant financial burdens in a situation of extreme financial
emergency, in the long run there has to be a fair distribution of public financial
burdens amongst the different groups of society.
Austerity-based pay cuts require thorough
reasoning during the legislative process
A core line of reasoning in the FCC’s recent judgment is that if the legislator wishes
to cut remuneration for civil servants for the sake of fiscal consolidation, it needs to
provide a “coherent and comprehensive concept of budget consolidation”. Although
the legislator in principle only owes a valid law, cuts in civil servant remuneration
need procedural safeguards according to the FCC’s second senate. Because
the principle of equitable remuneration does not require a particular amount,
constitutional demands can only be effectively met if review is based on procedural
requirements. This line of reasoning is not new, but has long been developed by
the second senate of the FCC (see only here). While for the first senate it suffices
that the legislator can provide a justification for a given law that is in line with the
constitution during the proceedings (on the debate see here), the second senate
requires the legislator to prove that such a reasoned debate has already taken place
during the legislative procedure. Hence, a mere constitutional justifiability is not
enough. The judges of the second senate argue that otherwise the intended added
rationalization of the legislative process could not be guaranteed. After all, the whole
idea of a duty to justify pay cuts is that the legislator really takes into consideration
the relevant and sometimes contradictory constitutional requirements, assesses
different possible measures to reach the intended goal and fully considers the
consequences of the respective measures for the affected civil servants. Similarly,
the PCC required the Portuguese legislator to provide a sound justification of the
respective pay cuts and show that it has considered the opposing interests and
constitutional demands at stake.
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Public pay cuts require a coherent reasoning and
the consideration of alternatives
The PCC decided that the legislator, when deciding pay cuts for public employees,
needs to actively consider alternative measures that would also lead to the aspired
fiscal consolidation. Hence, it suggested that the legislator in particular also
considers complementing or substituting pay cuts with higher tax rates to a certain
extent. Moreover, in its first decision on pay cuts (Portuguese only) during the
Eurozone crisis, it explicitly justified the cuts by reference to the coherent and
rational strategy of the legislator that also included raising tax rates and cutting other
public expenditure.
The requirement for a coherent strategy also echoes in the FCC’s recent judgment.
The German court however, goes even beyond the requirements developed by
the PCC. According to the FCC, a strategy requires that the legislator first clearly
defines the aim pursued in a quantifiable manner. Next, the legislator has to consider
different possible measures that can contribute to the pre-defined goal. Notably, the
legislator is required to give reasons for why a particular measure has been chosen
and not another and in how far the chosen measure leads to achieving the desired
result or still needs to be complemented by other measures. In the view of the FCC,
such a detailed justification is necessary to assess the coherence and plausibility
of the measures under review. Although such reasoning was not fully articulated
in the PCC’s initial case law, a systematic reading of the rulings points to the same
conclusion. Initially, the court was very receptive towards the legislator’s argument
that the urgent need to address the budgetary imbalance required the adoption of
cuts in public wages as this was an evidently apt mechanism to swiftly reduce public
expenditure. However, as time passed by, the Portuguese top court progressively
demanded that the legislator devised other political options to cope with the financial
situation as well as provided not only a stronger justification for the restrictions but
also the different possible alternatives.
Preventing economic colonization and ensuring
open political discourse
In demanding not only that the legislator thoroughly discusses austerity measures,
but also requiring the cuts to be part of a coherent concept to achieve the pursued
fiscal goal, the two courts at first sight restrict the discretion of the legislator.
However, a different assessment of the judgments lends itself to support. By
clarifying that the mere reference to a fiscal consolidation and the need for austerity
does not in itself justify public pay cuts, the two courts set clear limits to economic
arguments as trumps in constitutional discourse. Both courts have managed to
establish constitutional requirements that set meaningful and perceptible limits to
a purely economic rationale. By doing so, they have strengthened the relevance
of their respective constitutions as points of reference for the political handling of
economic and fiscal crises. In this sense, the developed constitutional requirements
may also serve to ensure the openness of the political discourse about crisis reaction
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by requiring the legislator to explicitly consider alternatives and to assess the
fundamental rights consequences of the measures taken.
Of course, one might argue that the democratic legislator should be free to even
neglect alternative political options. Such an argument however, ignores the factual
circumstances of political and parliamentary decision-making in times of exceptional
financial situations. Typically, in these situations the parliamentary debates are
strongly accelerated, dominated by governmental financial expert opinion and,
under the urgent threat of financial collapse, do not leave room for the thorough
deliberation of potential alternatives. In that respect, there is a clear distinction
between the PCC and the FCC. While the former has developed its jurisprudence in
an acute financial crisis, the latter was not confronted with a political debate based
on fiscal emergency. The PCC made it explicit that it allows the legislator more
discretion in times of an acute fiscal threat, but that the standard of review becomes
stricter the longer the crisis lasts. Thereby the PCC ensures that considerations and
discursive limitations that have been expectable in times of fiscal emergency do not
persistently limit the legislative debate.
The FCC’s judgment, on the other hand, can be understood as a clarification
and adaption of constitutional requirements in the light of a recent constitutional
amendment. Lifting the debt brake to the constitutional level, however, does
not mean that fiscal arguments in and of themselves become trumps in any
constitutional discourse. Nor is the constitutional commitment to sound public
finances a justification for cutting off political discourse with a reference to a lack of
viable alternatives. Such a commitment does not predetermine the means by which
to achieve the end, nor does it discredit a particular political option automatically.
By clarifying that the debt brake cannot serve per se as a justification for whatever
austerity measure, the FCC, just like the PCC, has re-articulated the constitutional
standard in times of fiscal consolidation and strengthened the constitution’s role as
the core normative reference point of our political community. From this perspective,
the judgments of the two constitutional courts can be understood as an attempt to
ensure through procedural requirements that the political discourse is actually kept
open and that fundamental rights are duly taken into account even in times of crisis.
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